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ROSALES V. STATE: TIME FOR A CHANGE, WITNESS 




As a general principle, evidence doctrine bars the use of character 
evidence to prove that a person acted in accordance with a particular trait on 
a specific occasion.1  The federal courts and most states, including Maryland, 
make an exception to this general pronouncement, allowing a witness to be 
impeached with evidence of  prior criminal convictions.2  This exception is 
among the most controversial evidence rules.3  In Rosales v. State,4 the Court 
of Appeals held that a conviction under the Violent Crime in Aid of 
Racketeering Activity statute5 (“VICAR”) is a proper conviction for witness 
impeachment under Maryland Rule 5-609.6  In doing so, the Court of Appeals 
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 1. See MD. R. 5-404(a) (establishing that “evidence of a person’s character or character trait 
is not admissible to prove that the person acted in accordance with the character or trait on a 
particular occasion”); FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (establishing that “[e]vidence of a person’s character 
or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in 
accordance with the character or trait”).  
 2. FED. R. EVID. 609; Md. R. 5-609. 
 3. Montrè D. Carodine, “The Mis-Characterization of the Negro”: A Race Critique of the 
Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 524 (2009); Alan D. Hornstein, Between 
Rock and a Hard Place: The Right to Testify and Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L. 
REV. 1, 6 (1997).  
 4.  463 Md. 552, 206 A.3d 916 (2019).  
 5.  18 U.S.C. § 1959 (2018).   
 6.  Rosales, 463 Md. at 556–57, 206 A.3d at 918.   
The Rule states in relevant part, 
(a) Generally.  For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the 
witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or 
established by public record during examination of the witness, but only if (1) the crime 
was an infamous crime or other crime relevant to the witness’s credibility and (2) the 
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs the danger 
of unfair prejudice to the witness or the objecting party. 
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further blurred the line of admissible convictions under Maryland Rule 5-
609.  The current Rule sets forth a confusing framework for trial judges to 
decipher which crimes qualify for impeachment.  As such, the Rule is ripe 
for replacement.  While no alternative would be flawless, implementing 
Federal Rule of Evidence 609, or alternatively Alabama Rule of Evidence 
609 or Indiana Rule of Evidence 609, would cure many of the defects in 
Maryland Rule 5-609. 
Part I of this Note will discuss the underlying facts in Rosales and the 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals’ unreported decision.  Part II will 
examine the legal history of witness impeachment by use of a prior 
conviction in Maryland as well as the intricate features of Maryland Rule 5-
609.  Part III will review the Court of Appeals’ unanimous decision in 
Rosales.  Part IV of this Note will argue that the Court of Appeals improperly 
expanded rule 5-609 by interpreting VICAR convictions as relevant to a 
witness’s credibility.  Part IV will further advocate that due to the Rule’s 
inaccessible framework, as demonstrated in Rosales, Maryland Rule 5-609 
should be replaced in favor of a more workable rule, such as Federal Rule of 
Evidence 609, Alabama Rule of Evidence 609, or Indiana Rule of Evidence 
609.   
I. THE CASE  
In September 2012, Wilfredo Rosales was arrested in connection with 
an assault in Langley Park in Prince George’s County, Maryland.7  The 
victim of the assault, Hector Hernandez-Melendez, alleged that seven MS-13 
gang members approached him at the park and asked him to identify himself.8  
After refusing to identify himself or lift up his shirt to reveal identifying 
tattoos, the assailants threw Mr. Hernandez-Melendez to the ground and 
stabbed him.9  Mr. Hernandez-Melendez was only able to identify Mr. 
Rosales out of the seven assailants.10  Mr. Hernandez-Melendez knew Mr. 
Rosales did not commit the assault; however, he alleged Mr. Rosales 
                                                          
(b) Time Limit.  Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this Rule if a period of 
more than [fifteen] years has elapsed since the date of the conviction, except as to a 
conviction for perjury for which no time limit applies. 
MD. R. 5-609(a)–(b). 
 7.  Rosales, 463 Md. at 558, 206 A.3d at 919. 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id.  
 10.  Id.  Mr. Hernandez-Melendez had a prior relationship with Mr. Rosales.  Id.  In 2006, Mr. 
Hernandez-Melendez “walk[ed] through” Mr. Rosales.  Id. (alteration in original).  “Walking 
through” is the procedure to gain membership in MS-13.  Id. at 558 n.1, 206 A.3d at 919 n.1.  Mr. 
Hernandez-Melendez “walk[ed] through” Mr. Rosales for roughly four months before the two lost 
contact.  Id.  They did not regain contact until the incident in September of 2012.  Id. at 558–59, 
206 A.3d at 919. 
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orchestrated the attack.11  Further, Mr. Hernandez-Melendez alleged Mr. 
Rosales took “$150 from his wallet” after the attack was complete.12 
Mr. Hernandez-Melendez alleged members of the MS-13 gang ordered 
the attack as retaliation for his testimony in a 2009 District of Columbia 
criminal case against other members of the gang.13  Between 2005 and 2006, 
the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department identified Mr. 
Hernandez-Melendez as a full-fledged MS-13 gang member.14  Likewise, 
Mr. Rosales was a validated MS-13 gang member.15  Mr. Hernandez-
Melendez believed that a “green light,” or death order, was put out on him 
for his prior cooperation with law enforcement.16 
In May of 2013, a jury trial against Mr. Rosales commenced in the 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.17  The State brought nine charges 
against Mr. Rosales arising from the assault of Mr. Hernandez-Melendez.18  
As part of its case, the State called Mr. Hernandez-Melendez as a victim-
witness.19  Prior to the cross-examination of Mr. Hernandez-Melendez, the 
State moved in limine to preclude the defense from asking about Mr. 
Hernandez-Melendez’s 2011 federal convictions for “conspiracy to commit 
assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering and threatening to 
commit a crime of violence in aid of racketeering.”20 
The State argued that the convictions should be excluded for 
impeachment purposes because they did not meet the criteria under Maryland 
Rule 5-609.21  Rule 5-609 states, in relevant part: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence 
that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if 
elicited from the witness or established by public record during  
                                                          
 11.  Id. at 558, 206 A.3d at 919.  When questioned by detectives at Washington Hospital Center, 
Mr. Hernandez-Melendez informed detectives that he could not identify the person who stabbed 
him but that he recognized Mr. Rosales when he removed the money from his wallet.  Id.   
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Rosales v. State, No. 2659, 2017 WL 6312861, at *1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 11, 2017), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 463 Md. 552, 206 A.3d 916 (2019).  Mr. Hernandez-Melendez testified 
as a government witness in a federal homicide trial.  Rosales, 463 at 559, 206 A.2d at 920.  Detective 
Eliseo Medina, of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, characterized Mr. 
Hernandez-Melendez’s testimony as “very crucial and important.”  Rosales, 2017 WL 6312861 at 
*2. 
 14.  Rosales, 2017 WL 6312861 at *2.   
 15.  Id.  Detective Medina had stopped Mr. Rosales dozens of times based on his connection 
with other documented MS-13 gang members.  Id.  Further, “based on investigations, pictures, and 
interviews,” Mr. Rosales had been classified as a validated gang member.  Id.  
 16.  Id.  (“The number one rule violation leading to a green light is ‘associating with rivals or 
associating with law enforcement.’”). 
 17.  Rosales, 463 Md. at 559, 206 A.3d at 920.  The case was docketed Case No. CT121814X.  
Id. at 552, 206 A.3d at 916.  
 18.  Id. at 559, 206 A.3d at 920. 
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Id.  
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examination of the witness, but only if (1) the crime was an 
infamous crime or other crime relevant to the witness’s 
credibility . . . .22 
At trial, the defense argued Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s convictions 
were relevant to his credibility, and further, “were different from other crimes 
of violence.”23  The trial court disagreed with the defense and granted the 
State’s motion to exclude.24  Mr. Rosales was convicted of “retaliation 
against a witness” and “participation in a criminal gang.”25   
Mr. Rosales appealed the judgement to the Court of Special Appeals.26  
The main question to be answered on appeal was whether, “the trial court 
err[ed] in excluding the victim-witness’ prior convictions for crimes of 
violence in aid of racketeering activity?”27  A three-judge panel, comprised 
of Judges Graeff, Leahy, and Beachley, unanimously held that the circuit 
court did not err by excluding Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s prior 
convictions.28  Relying on precedent, the court ruled that whether a 
conviction for conspiracy qualifies under rule 5-609 “depends on the 
objective of the conspiracy.”29 
The Court of Special Appeals examined the substantive crimes 
underlying the VICAR convictions to decide whether Mr. Hernandez-
Melendez’s convictions qualified under the Rule.30  The court determined 
that the substantive acts underlying Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s convictions 
“involve[d] acts of violence.”31  Maryland precedent is clear that violent 
crimes, “generally have little, if any, bearing on honesty and veracity.”32  
Because crimes of violence are not eligible under Maryland Rule 5-609, the 
Court of Special Appeals held Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s convictions were 
                                                          
 22.  MD. R. 5-609(a). 
 23.  Rosales, 463 Md. at 559, 206 A.3d at 920. 
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Id. at 560, 206 A.3d at 920.  Mr. Rosales received a twelve-year sentence, with all but six 
years suspended on the retaliation charge and ten years with all but five suspended on the 
participation in a criminal gang charge.  Id.  Mr. Rosales was acquitted of “first and second degree 
assault, armed robbery, robbery, theft, and carrying a weapon.”  Rosales v. State, No. 2659, 2017 
WL 6312861, at *3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 11, 2017), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 463 Md. 552, 
206 A.3d 916 (2019). 
 26.  Rosales, 2017 WL 6312861, at *1. 
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Id. at *13. 
 29.  Id. at *7 (noting that a conviction for cocaine distribution was an impeachable offense 
under Maryland Rule 5-609 (citing In re Gary T., 222 Md. App. 374, 386, 112 A.3d 1108, 1115 
(2015))).   
 30.  Id. at *6.  
 31.  Id.  The crimes underlying Mr. Rosales’s convictions were “assault with a dangerous 
weapon in aid of racketeering activity and threatening to commit a crime of violence in aid of 
racketeering activity.”  Id. at *3.  
 32.  Id. at *6 (citing Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 364, 535 A.2d 445, 453 (1988) (finding that 
prostitution and solicitation are not proper crimes for impeachment)).  
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not proper for impeachment.33  Subsequently, the Court of Appeals granted 
Mr. Rosales’ petition for writ of certiorari to decide: (1) Whether a prior 
federal conviction “for committing a violent crime in aid of racketeering” 
was admissible for witness impeachment, and (2) whether the trial court’s 
failure to allow the defendant to use the witness’s prior convictions for the 
purposes of impeachment constituted harmless error.34 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND  
The issue of witness impeachment by use of a prior conviction dates 
back to the English Common Law.35  Under the common law, “one who had 
been convicted of treason, any felony, a misdemeanor involving dishonesty, 
or crimes relating to the obstruction of justice, was considered incompetent 
to testify at any trial.”36  In 1898, for the first time, English law granted 
criminal defendants the right to testify on their own behalf.37  Interestingly 
enough, this law specifically forbid prosecutors from inquiring into the 
defendant’s prior convictions.38  Since then, courts around the United States 
have grappled with how to properly restrict witness impeachment by use of 
a prior conviction.39  Section II.A discusses the historical development of 
Maryland Rule 5-609.  Section II.B examines the purpose of the Rule.  
Section II.C explores the “eligible universe” of crimes suitable for 
                                                          
 33.  Id. at *8.  
 34.  Rosales v. State, 463 Md. 552, 556, 206 A.3d 916, 917 (2019).  Following the grant of 
certiorari, the Court of Appeals sua sponte raised the additional question of whether there was 
jurisdiction to hear petitioner’s untimely appeal.  See id. at 565 n.4, 206 A.3d at 923 n.4 (thanking 
the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure for bringing the inconsistency to the 
court’s attention); see also Oral Argument at 15:50, Rosales v. State, 463 Md. 552, 206 A.3d 916 
(2019) (No. 6), https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/import/coappeals/media/2018/coa 
20180907caseno6.mp4. 
 35.  State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 214, 642 A.2d 870, 874 (1994).  
 36.  Id. (citing CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 42, at 142 
(John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)).   
 37.  Criminal Evidence Act 1898, 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, § 1(f) (Eng.).  
 38.  Id.  The Act lists three exceptions to this general bar.  The Act states, in relevant part, 
(f) A person charged and called as a witness in pursuance of this Act shall not be asked . . . 
any question tending to show that he has committed or been convicted of or been charged 
with any offence other than that wherewith he is then charged, or is of bad character, 
unless—  
(i) the proof that he has committed or been convicted of such other offence is 
admissible evidence to show that he is guilty of the offence wherewith he is then 
charged; or  
(ii) he has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the witnesses for the 
prosecution with a view to establish his own good character, or has given evidence 
of his good character, or the nature or conduct of the defense is such as to involve 
imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution; 
or  
(iii) he has given evidence against any other person charged with the same offence. 
Id.   
 39.  See infra Section IV.B.2.   
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impeachment.  Finally, Section II.D ponders the facial approach of Maryland 
Rule 5-609.  Section II.E surveys the balancing test employed by Maryland 
Rule 5-609. 
A. The Historical Development of Maryland Rule 5-609 
The Maryland legislature first addressed the disqualification of felons 
from testifying in 1864 when the General Assembly enacted Chapter 109.40  
Chapter 109 eliminated the total bar to testifying for those convicted of 
infamous crimes but made those convictions eligible for witness 
impeachment.41  This statute has remained largely the same for over 150 
years42 and was most recently codified as Annotated Code of Maryland, 
Courts and Judicial Procedure, section 10-905.43  Section 10-905 states, in 
relevant part, “Evidence is admissible to prove . . . [the witness’s] conviction 
of an infamous crime.”44 
On January 2, 1975, Congress passed the Federal Rules of Evidence.45   
The Federal Rules of Evidence include rule 609, which allows for the 
impeachment of a witness by use of a qualifying prior conviction.46  Using 
Federal Rule 609 as a model, on November 1, 1991, the Court of Appeals 
adopted rule 1-502 to govern witness impeachment by use of a prior 
conviction in Maryland.47  On July 1, 1994, in an effort to consolidate and 
                                                          
 40.  1864 Md. Laws 136; see also State v. Westpoint, 404 Md. 455, 474, 947 A.2d 519, 530–
31 (2008) (finding that when the legislature passed “Chapter 109 in 1864 it intended to remove this 
common law disqualification”). 
 41.  1864 Md. Laws 136, 138; Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 359, 535 A.2d 445, 450 (1988). 
 42.  Prout, 311 Md. at 558–59, 535 A.2d at 450. 
 43.  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-905(a) (LexisNexis 2013).   
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. app. (2018)).  
 46.  FED. R. EVID. 609.   
The Rule states, in relevant part, 
(a) In General.  The following rules apply to attacking a witness’s character for 
truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction:  
(1) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by death or by 
imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence:  
(A) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case or in a criminal case 
in which the witness is not a defendant; and  
(B) must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is a defendant, if 
the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to that 
defendant; and  
(2) for any crime regardless of the punishment, the evidence must be admitted if the 
court can readily determine that establishing the elements of the crime required 
proving—or the witness’s admitting—a dishonest act or false statement.  
Id. 
 47.  State v. Westpoint, 404 Md. 455, 476, 947 A.2d 519, 532 (2008).  Rule 1-502 superseded 
Annotated Code of Maryland, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, section 10-905 because 
Maryland rules usually apply even where a prior statute is inconsistent.  Beales v. State, 329 Md. 
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clarify the State’s rules on evidence, Title 5 of the Maryland Rules of Practice 
and Procedure became the governing rules of evidence for Maryland state 
courts.48  As part of this new collection of laws, Maryland Rule 5-609 
replaced rule 1-502.49 
B. The Purpose of Maryland Rule 5-609 
The Maryland Rules of Evidence were designed with the goals of 
determining the truth and ensuring proceedings are conducted in a just 
manner.50  Witness impeachment by use of a prior conviction is designed to 
help the factfinder gauge the credibility of the witness.51  However, Maryland 
Rule 5-609 was designed to limit the factfinder’s prejudice to the witness by 
narrowing the circumstances in which a past conviction could be used for 
impeachment.52  Essentially, rule 5-609 serves as a safeguard against a 
factfinder disregarding the witness’s testimony because of the witness’s past 
criminal acts, or because they think the witness is generally a bad person.53 
C. The Eligible Universe of Crimes: A Complicated Universe to 
Navigate 
In order to admit a prior conviction for impeachment under rule 5-609, 
a court must first determine if the conviction falls within the “eligible 
universe.”54  Rule 5-609 delineates two categories of convictions that are 
eligible for impeachment.55  Convictions are eligible for impeachment only 
if the crime is (1) “an infamous crime” or (2) an “other crime relevant to the 
                                                          
263, 273, 619 A.2d 105, 110 (1993) (citing Johnson v. Swann, 314 Md. 285, 289, 550 A.2d 703 
(1988)).  
 48.  Walker v. State, 107 Md. App. 502, 516, 668 A.2d 990, 997 (1995), aff’d, 345 Md. 293, 
691 A.2d 1341 (1997); Alan D. Hornstein, The New Maryland Rules of Evidence: Survey, Analysis 
and Critique, 54 MD. L. REV. 1032, 1032–34 (1995) (explaining that prior to the adoption of Title 
5 “Maryland evidence law consisted of a grab bag of statutory provisions, rules of practice and, 
primarily, common-law precedent”).  
 49.  Westpoint, 404 Md. at 478, 947 A.2d at 533.  Rules 5-609 and 1-502 are nearly identical 
in their language and function.  There are four minor differences between rules 1-502 and 5-609.  
The first difference is rule 5-609(a) included the phrase “during examination” while rule 1-502(a) 
read “on cross-examination.”  LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE 153 (1994).  The 
second difference is that section (a) was divided into clauses (1) and (2) to show “that section (a)’s 
balancing test applies to both categories of prior convictions.”  Id.  The third difference is the final 
sentence of rule 1-502(a)’s Committee note is omitted because it is “inconsistent with Rule 5-607.”  
Id.  The final difference is the addition of the second sentence “to the Committee note following 
section(a).”  Id.   
 50.  Brown v. State, 373 Md. 234, 258, 817 A.2d 241, 255 (2003) (Wilner, J., dissenting). 
 51.  Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 703, 436 A.2d 906, 907 (1981).  
 52.  Id. at 703, 436 A.2d at 907.  
 53.  Westpoint, 404 Md. at 478, 947 A.2d at 533. 
 54.  MD. R. 5-609(a); Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300, 324, 26 A.3d 899, 913 (2011). 
 55. MD. R. 5-609(a) (noting that “infamous crime[s]” and “other crime[s] relevant to the 
witness’s credibility” are proper for impeachment).  
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witness’s credibility.”56  Infamous crimes include treason, common law 
felonies,57 and other relevant offenses generally classified as crimen falsi.58 
Since the enactment of Maryland Rule 1-502 and subsequently 
Maryland Rule 5-609, Maryland courts have struggled to define what 
qualifies as an “other crime relevant to the witness’s credibility.”59  Crimes 
that fall into this category have to show, “the perpetrator ‘lives a life of 
secrecy’ and engages in ‘dissembling in the course of [the crime], being 
prepared to say whatever is required by the demands of the moment, whether 
the truth or a lie.’”60  In other words, to qualify under the “other crime 
relevant to a witness’s credibility” category, the conviction must question 
whether the witness’s testimony should be believed.61  Absent this tendency 
to show untruthfulness, the conviction should not be admitted.62 
Maryland courts have not been able to consistently delineate which 
crimes are relevant to a witness’s credibility under Maryland Rule 5-609.  In 
practice, the construction of rule 5-609 requires the Court of Appeals to grant 
certiorari to a case which presents a previously unexplored conviction for 
impeachment.63  This construction has left trial courts, and the intermediate 
appellate court, vulnerable to reversible error subject to the Court of Appeals 
decision regarding the novel conviction.64 
Some firm categories of eligible convictions have been established.  
Crimes of violence, “which may result from a short temper, a combative 
nature, extreme provocation, or other causes generally have little or no direct 
bearing on honesty or veracity” and thus, are not eligible for witness 
                                                          
 56.  Id.  
 57.  Common law felonies include “murder, manslaughter, robbery, rape, burglary, larceny, 
arson, sodomy and mayhem.”  Robinson v. State, 4 Md. App. 515, 523 n.3, 243 A.2d 879, 884 n.3 
(1968)(citing HOCHHEIMER’S CRIMINAL LAW § 6 (1st ed.)). 
 58.  Crimes traditionally “classified as crimen falsi include crimes in the nature of perjury, false 
statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, false pretense, or any other offense involving some 
element of deceitfulness, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the witness’s propensity to 
testify truthfully.”  Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 269–70, 619 A.2d 105, 108 (1993).  
 59.  MD. R. 5-609(a); see also State v. Westpoint, 404 Md. 455, 476, 947 A.2d 519, 531 (2008) 
(recognizing “it is difficult to draw distinct lines on what crimes may be used to impeach”).  
 60.  Anderson v. State, 227 Md. App. 329, 339, 133 A.3d 1266, 1271–72 (2016) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Washington v. State, 191 Md. App 48, 82 990 A.2d 549, 569 (2010)).   
 61. MD. R. 5-609(a); Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 707, 436 A.3d 906, 909–10 (1981).  
 62.  Westpoint, 404 Md. at 476, 947 A.2d at 531.  
 63.  State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 216 n.8, 642 A.2d 870, 875 n.8 (1994).  
 64.  See King v. State, 407 Md. 682, 706–08, 967 A.2d 790, 804–05 (2009) (reversing the Court 
of Special Appeals affirmance of the trial court’s exclusion of a previous possession with intent to 
distribute marijuana conviction); Westpoint, 404 Md. at 495, 947 A.2d at 543 (affirming the Court 
of Special Appeals reversal of the trial court’s admission of a third-degree sexual offense under rule 
5-609); Giddens, 335 Md. at 222, 642 A.2d at 878 (reversing the Court of Special Appeals ruling 
that distribution of cocaine was not an impeachable offense under rule 5-609); State v. Duckett, 306 
Md. 503, 512, 510 A.2d 253, 258 (1986) (affirming the Court of Special Appeals reversal of the 
trial court’s admission of a previous assault and battery conviction). 
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impeachment.65  Generally, Maryland courts have found that simple 
possession of a controlled substance does not bear on a witness’s 
credibility.66  In contrast, a conviction for possession with intent to distribute 
has been held to be relevant to a witness’s veracity because the crime 
inherently involves deceit.67  Likewise, convictions for crimes involving theft 
and robbery have been held admissible for impeachment purposes under rule 
5-609.68 
D. No Conviction Left Behind: The Facial Approach of Maryland Rule 
5-609 
When determining whether a conviction is eligible under Maryland Rule 
5-609, Maryland judges look at the elements required for conviction, and not 
the underlying facts of the case.  This approach resembles a facial analysis.  
Trial courts are not to “conduct a mini-trial” by looking at the individual 
circumstances of a witness’s prior conviction.69  In order for a prior 
conviction to be admitted for impeachment, the elements of the conviction 
must “describe[] with sufficient specificity the conduct reflecting on the 
defendant’s credibility.”70  If the conviction does not, by its elements, clearly 
state conduct bearing on a witness’s credibility, then it should be excluded.71  
Secrecy alone is not sufficient to make a prior conviction eligible for 
impeachment.72 
The Reporter’s Notes for rule 1-502 state that the subcommittee 
unequivocally felt that trial courts should not examine the underlying facts of 
a conviction.73  The subcommittee found that, “[t]he marginal gain in 
probative value on the question of credibility in a particular case [is] likely to 
                                                          
 65.  Duckett, 306 Md. at 512, 510 A.2d at 257–58 (quoting Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 
936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968)); see also Fulp v. State, 130 Md. App. 
157, 745 A.2d 438 (2000) (ruling that a conviction for assault with intent to murder is not sufficient 
under rule 5-609).  
 66.  See Morales v. State, 325 Md. 330, 330, 600 A.2d 851, 851 (1992) (holding possession of 
cocaine was not an impeachable offense); see also Lowery v. State, 292 Md. 2, 2, 437 A.2d 193, 
193 (1981) (finding that possession of barbiturates was not proper for impeachment under rule 5-
609).  
 67.  See Giddens, 335 Md. at 205, 642 A.2d at 870 (finding possession of cocaine with intent 
to distribute to be a proper crime for impeachment); see also King, 407 Md. at 706–07, 967 A.3d at 
804 (holding possession with intent to distribute marijuana to be an impeachable offense).  
 68.  See Jackson v. State, 340 Md. 705, 668 A.2d 8 (1995) (holding that theft was an 
impeachable offense).  But see Morales, 325 Md. at 339, 600 A.2d at 855 (holding that assault and 
battery was not a proper conviction for impeachment).  
 69.  Giddens, 335 Md. at 222, 642 A.2d at 878; see also Westpoint, 404 Md. at 480, 947 A.2d 
at 534.  
 70.  Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 713, 436 A.2d 906, 913 (1981).  
 71. See id. at 714–15 (holding that indecent exposure was not a proper crime for impeachment 
under rule 5-609); see also State v. Duckett, 306 Md. 503, 509, 510 A.2d 253, 256 (1986) (holding 
that assault and battery were not sufficiently specific to qualify under rule 5-609).   
 72.  Westpoint, 404 Md. at 486, 947 A.2d at 537.  
 73.  Giddens, 335 Md. at 222, 642 A.2d at 878.  
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be substantially outweighed by the expenditure of judicial resources 
necessary to examine the facts underlying prior convictions in every case.”74  
Under rule 5-609, a witness can only be questioned about the name and date 
of the conviction as well as the sentence imposed.75  Due to the restrictive 
nature of the facial approach, Maryland courts have struggled to identify if a 
crime’s elements specifically identify conduct that bears on the witness’s 
credibility, and thus, is admissible under rule 5-609. 
The facial approach dilemma is highlighted in Giddens v. State.76  In 
Giddens, a divided Court of Special Appeals77 held that distribution of 
cocaine does not, by its elements, state conduct bearing on the witness’s 
credibility.78  The court reasoned that the crime could be committed in a 
multitude of ways ranging from “selling a ton of cocaine to sub-dealers 
throughout a community as well as by giving a friend a marijuana 
cigarette.”79  The Court of Special Appeals ruled that even though the 
behavior is certainly criminal, it is not inherently dishonest.80  The 
concurrence was troubled by the fact that under a facial approach, convictions 
for the distribution of narcotics would never be admissible because courts 
cannot evaluate the manner in which the crime was committed.81 
The Court of Appeals82 reversed, and held that distribution of cocaine is 
inherently dishonest, despite the range of potential circumstances of 
conviction.83  The Court of Appeals stated, “in theory, some activity that falls 
within the definition of drug distribution would not be probative of an 
individual’s lack of veracity, [however] the vast majority of convictions for 
cocaine distribution are relevant to credibility.”84  Thus, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that cocaine distribution was not so “ill-defined” as to warrant 
exclusion.85 
                                                          
 74.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting RULES ORDER, 1-502 cmt. (1992)).  
 75.  Giddens, 335 Md. at 222, 642 A.2d at 878.  
 76.  97 Md. App. 582, 631 A.2d 499 (1993), rev’d, 335 Md. 205, 642 A.2d 870 (1994).  
 77.  The appeal generated a majority, concurring, and dissenting opinion.  Giddens, 97 Md. 
App. at 582–83, 631 A.2d at 499. 
 78.  Id. at 592, 631 A.2d at 504.  
 79.  Id. at 591, 631 A.2d at 503.  
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 593, 631 A.2d at 504 (Motz, J., concurring). 
 82.  This opinion generated a five-judge majority opinion and a two-judge dissenting opinion.  
Giddens, 335 Md. at 205, 642 A.2d at 870.  The dissent endorsed the majority opinion of the Court 
of Special Appeals.  Id. at 223, 642 A.2d at 878.   
 83.  Id. at 222, 642 A.2d at 878.  
 84.  Id. at 218, 642 A.2d at 876.  
 85.  Id.  
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E. Insult to Injury: The Required Balancing Test Under Maryland Rule 
5-609 
One of the distinct features of rule 5-609 is that every conviction is 
subject to a balancing test to determine if “the probative value of admitting 
[the] evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the witness or the 
objecting party.”86  Due to this balancing test, rule 5-609 does not have any 
“per se” admissible convictions.87  The Maryland Senate Rules Committee 
notes on rule 1-502 indicate “the Committee’s preference for a broadly-
applied balancing test” and recognize that “the then-existing law of 
impeachment [was] ‘dangerously inflexible in its mandate.’”88  The 
balancing test is a matter of judicial discretion.89  The Court of Appeals has 
not given any firm rules or strict guidelines for trial courts to follow when 
conducting the balancing test.90  Instead, the court has expressed its support 
of trial judges retaining wide discretion in making witness impeachment 
decisions.91 
The Court of Appeals has designated certain factors it believes will be 
valuable to trial courts tasked with conducting the balancing test.92  These 
factors include: “(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime; (2) the point 
in time of the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history; (3) the 
similarity between the past crime and the charged crime; (4) the importance 
of the defendant’s testimony; and (5) the centrality of the defendant’s 
credibility.”93  Maryland courts, in applying these factors, need not do so 
“mechanically or exclusively.”94 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING  
Writing for a unanimous court,95 Judge Getty of the Court of Appeals 
affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Special Appeals decision.  
The Court of Appeals held: (a) Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s “convictions for 
                                                          
 86.  MD. R. 5-609(a)(2).  
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 271–72, 619 A.2d 105, 109 (1993) (quoting STANDING 
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, MEETING MINUTES (Sept. 1990)).  
 89.  Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 364, 535 A.2d 445, 452 (1988). 
 90.  Id. at 364, 535 A.2d at 452.   
 91.  Id. (finding that a narrow test “would be contrary to our suggestion that the trial judge 
exercise a sound discretion in each case where the issue arises”).  
 92.  Jackson v. State, 340 Md. 705, 717, 668 A.2d 8, 14 (1995).   
 93.  Id. (citing United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 1976)).  Importantly, under 
rule 5-609, the same or similar crimes are not automatically excluded.  Id. at 711, 668 A.2d at 11.  
Further, the risk of prejudice is reduced when a non-defendant witness is to be impeached.  King v. 
State, 407 Md. 682, 704, 967 A.2d 790, 803 (2009).  
 94.  Jackson, 340 Md. at 717, 668 A.2d at 14.  
 95.  The Court of Appeals is comprised of seven judges who all participate in every case before 
the court.  MD. COURT OF APPEALS, https://www.courts.state.md.us/coappeals (last visited Mar. 18, 
2020).  
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conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering 
and threatening to commit a crime of violence in aid of racketeering” in 
violation of Title 18, section 1959 of the United States Code were admissible 
under Maryland Rule 5-609 for witness impeachment, and (b) the circuit 
court committed harmless error in ruling Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s 
convictions were not impeachable.96  As a result, the Court of Appeals 
reversed the trial court’s exclusion of the conviction, but found that Mr. 
Rosales was not entitled to a new trial.97 
A. Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s Convictions Under 18 U.S.C. § 1959 
Were Admissible Under Maryland Rule 5-609 
The court ruled that based on the elements98 required, a VICAR 
conviction was a proper impeachable offense under Maryland Rule 5-
609(a)(1).99  The court reasoned that convictions under section 1959 require 
“extraordinary dishonesty” which require “great pains to conceal.”100  
Specifically, the court found that in order to be convicted under section 1959, 
an individual must commit the underlying crime with the intention of 
benefitting either the criminal organization or the perpetrator’s standing in 
the organization.101  In the court’s view, a VICAR conviction inherently 
suggests that a witness would be willing to lie under oath, just as they were 
willing to deceive society to benefit or increase standing in the criminal 
organization.102 
The Court of Appeals rejected the lower court’s opinion that VICAR 
convictions are ordinary crimes of violence.103  Rather, in VICAR trials, 
“[t]he government must prove elements concerning both the enterprise and 
the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt to successfully” convict.104  The 
court reasoned that the intent to cover up racketeering, and not the underlying 
                                                          
 96.  Rosales v. State, 463 Md. 552, 552, 206 A.3d 916, 916 (2019).  The court also decided 
whether appellate time-filling violations were jurisdictional in nature.  Id. at 552, 206 A.3d at 919.  
In deciding this issue, the court ruled that appellate time-filing violations trigger claims-processing 
rules and, thus, are not jurisdictional in nature.  Id. at 568, 206 A.3d at 925.  The court’s decision 
tracked the recent United States Supreme Court decision Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services 
of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017).  In Hamer, the Court ruled Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(a)(5)(C)’s limitation on appellate time filing had no statutory basis and, thus, is a mandatory 
claim-processing rule.  Id. at 16–17.  For a further discussion of the appellate time-filing dilemma, 
see, Mathew H. Frederick et. al., United States Supreme Court Update, 30 APP. ADVOC. 259, 259 
(2017).  
 97.  Rosales, 463 Md. at 557, 206 A.3d at 918–19.  
 98.  For a discussion of the elements, see infra Section IV.A.1. 
 99.  Rosales, 463 Md. at 579, 206 A.3d at 931–32. 
 100.  Id. at 574, 206 A.3d at 928 (quoting State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 217, 642 A.2d 870, 
876 (1994)).  
 101.  Id. at 577, 206 A.3d at 930. 
 102.  Id. at 572, 206 A.3d at 927. 
 103.  Id. at 578, 206 A.3d at 931 (explaining “the requisite mens rea is unlike that of typical acts 
of violence”).  
 104.  Id. at 577, 206 A.3d at 930.  
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violent offenses, are what “make[] VICAR convictions inherently 
deceitful.”105  Much of the conduct required for a VICAR conviction 
“requires secrecy and tears at the fabric of society.”106  The court concluded 
that a VICAR conviction, by its elements, clearly identified prior conduct 
that tended to show the perpetrator was unworthy of belief.107  To support its 
reasoning, the court noted “the great majority of enumerated offenses [under 
section 1959] meet [the] criteria” under Maryland Rule 5-609(a)(1).108  Thus, 
because the elements of the crime suggest the perpetrator must be “prepared 
to say whatever is required by the demands of the moment” and because “the 
great majority” of enumerated crimes would qualify, the Court of Appeals 
ruled Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s prior convictions fell within the “eligible 
universe” for impeachment under Maryland Rule 5-609.109 
B. The Circuit Court’s Omission of Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s
Convictions Constituted Harmless Error
The court ruled that not allowing the defense counsel to impeach 
Mr. Hernandez-Melendez under Maryland Rule 5-609 was harmless 
error.110  At trial, Mr. Hernandez-Melendez testified that he engaged in 
criminal activity as an MS-13 gang member.111  Further, Mr. Hernandez-
Melendez testified that he had been incarcerated for approximately four 
years.112  Throughout the trial, the defense counsel also referred to Mr. 
Hernandez-Melendez as “a convicted felon” and “a gangster.”113  The court 
reasoned that through these references, the jury had the opportunity to 
make a determination as to Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s credibility.114            
Allowing impeachment of Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s convictions, 
“would add little value to the jury’s consideration of the witness’ 
credibility.”115   As a result, the court concluded the testimony presented 
105. Id. at 579, 206 A.3d at 931.
106. Id.; accord State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 217, 642 A.2d 870, 876 (1994) (finding that
cocaine distribution similarly burdens society). 
107. Rosales, 463 Md. at 579, 206 A.3d at 931–32.
108. Id. at 579, 206 A.3d at 932; see also Pamela Bucy Pierson, RICO Trends: From Gangsters 
to Class Actions, 65 S.C. L. REV. 213, 221 (2013) (finding that gang and drug distribution operations 
make up a significant portion of prosecuted racketeering activity). 
109. Rosales, 463 Md. at 578–80, 206 A.3d at 931–32 (quoting Giddens, 335 Md. at 217, 642
A.2d at 876 (1994)).
110. Id. at 583, 206 A.3d at 934.
111. Id. at 582, 206 A.3d at 933.
112. Id. Mr. Hernandez-Melendez “also stated that he was on probation both at the time of the




114 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ONLINE [VOL. 79:101 
was sufficient for the jury to evaluate Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s 
credibility.116 
IV. ANALYSIS
In Rosales v. State, the Court of Appeals held that a prior conviction for
committing a violent crime in aid of racketeering 117 was a crime relevant to 
credibility under Maryland Rule 5-609.118  The court erred by concluding that 
the elements required for a VICAR conviction require deceit.  Rosales 
demonstrates the need to reform Maryland Rule 5-609 to provide trial judges 
with a workable standard for determining whether a prior conviction is proper 
for witness impeachment.119  This Part proceeds in two sections.  Section 
IV.A. discusses witness impeachment for a prior VICAR conviction.120
Section IV.B. addresses the need to rethink Maryland Rule 5-609.121
A. Witness Impeachment by Prior VICAR Conviction
In Rosales, the court ruled that a VICAR conviction, by its elements,
describes the conduct impacting a witness’s credibility with sufficient 
specificity.122  This Section lays out how the court over-extended Maryland 
Rule 5-609 by applying it to VICAR convictions, and further, how Maryland 
precedent regarding witness impeachment is flawed.  Specifically, Section 
IV.A.1 discusses the underlying VICAR statute and its broad reach.123
Section IV.A.2 discusses how the Rosales court erred by relying on the logic
of State v. Giddens.124
1. The Underlying Statute: The Broad Net of 18 U.S.C. § 1959
Title 18, section 1959 of the United States Code criminalizes violent 
crimes committed in aid of racketeering activity.  Unlike robbery, treason, or 
theft, a defendant can be convicted of a VICAR offense under a multitude of 
circumstances.125  The wide array of potential crimes eligible for conviction 
under section 1959 renders it ill-suited to be considered as an “other crime 
relevant to credibility” under Maryland Rule 5-609.  A VICAR conviction 
requires that the government show: 
116. Id. at 583, 206 A.3d at 934.  But see Devincentz v. State, 460 Md. 518, 562, 191 A.3d 373, 
399 (2018) (ruling the exclusion of the victim’s stepbrother’s “testimony was not harmless” error 
because the “errors affected the jury’s ability to assess [the victim’s] credibility”).  
117. Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (2018).
118. Rosales, 463 Md. at 583, 206 A.3d at 934; see also supra Section III.A.
119. See infra Section IV.A.2.
120. See infra Section IV.A.
121. See infra Section IV.B.
122. Rosales, 463 Md. at 583, 206 A.3d at 934.
123. See infra Section IV.A.1.
124. 335 Md. 205, 642 A.2d 870 (1994); see infra Section IV.A.2.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 195(a)(1–6) (2018).
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(1) that the [o]rganization was a RICO enterprise, (2) that the 
enterprise was engaged in racketeering activity as defined in RICO, 
(3) that the defendant in question had a position in the enterprise, 
(4) that the defendant committed the alleged crime of violence, and 
(5) that [their] general purpose in so doing was to maintain or 
increase [their] position in the enterprise.126 
Section 1959 specifically enumerates a variety of violent crimes; such as, 
murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, and kidnapping as predicate 
underlying felonies necessary for conviction.127 
The broad range of circumstances possible for a section 1959 conviction 
renders it inappropriate for impeachment under Maryland Rule 5-609.  In 
order to accomplish its intended purposes, section 1959 should be interpreted 
liberally.128  To satisfy this liberal end, courts have ruled that the criminal 
enterprise need only have “a de minimis interstate commerce connection.”129  
Courts have consistently rejected facial challenges alleging that section 1959 
exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.130  Instead, courts have 
found this connection to interstate commerce in a vast array of 
circumstances.131  Further, courts have generally rejected a test requiring the 
                                                          
 126.  United States v. Odum, 878 F.3d 508, 516 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. 
Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 381 (2d. Cir. 1992)), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Frazier v. United 
States, 139 S. Ct. 319 (2018).  Under section 1959, an “‘enterprise’ includes any partnership, 
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in 
fact although not a legal entity, which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or 
foreign commerce.”  18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2). 
 127.  18 U.S.C. § 1959(a).  The statute also includes maiming, and “threaten[ing] to commit a 
crime of violence against any individual in violation of the laws of any State or the United States, 
or attempt[ing] or conspir[ing] to do so” as predicate felonies.  Id.   
 128.  United States v. Mapp, 170 F.3d 328, 335–36 (2d. Cir 1999) (ruling that a murder 
committed unintentionally can fulfill the purpose requirement of section 1959).  
 129.  United States v. Mills, 378 F. Supp. 3d 563, 571–73 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (quoting United 
States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 538 (6th Cir. 2001)); see, e.g., id. (noting that “[i]nsofar as it 
concerns VICAR in particular, a court must decide ‘whether Congress could rationally have 
concluded that intrastate acts of violence . . . committed for the purpose of maintaining or increasing 
one’s status in an interstate racketeering enterprise, would substantially affect the interstate 
activities of that enterprise’” (quoting United States v. Umana, 750 F.3d 320, 336 (4th Cir. 2014))); 
United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 773 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that although the evidence 
presented to prove an “interstate commerce connection [was] not copious,” it was sufficient).  
 130.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT CRIMES IN AID OF RACKETEERING 18 U.S.C. § 1959: A 
MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 13 (2006), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usam/legacy/2014/10/17/vcar.pdf.; see United States v. 
Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977, 983–87 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding “that the activity regulated by § 1959 
substantially affects interstate commerce”); United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 28, 34 (1st Cir. 
2002) (finding that a jury instruction requiring that a defendant’s actions had “some effect on 
interstate commerce” was sufficient to meet the requirements for a VICAR conviction).  
 131.  See United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 45 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that the purchase 
and subsequent transportation of firearms over state lines was sufficient to establish a de minimis 
connection to interstate commerce); Crenshaw, 359 F.3d at 992 (finding that the “Rolling 60s Crips” 
were an organization engaged in interstate commerce by virtue of their smuggling and distribution 
of up to ten kilograms of cocaine per month from Louisiana and California to Minnesota); Riddle, 
249 F.3d at 537 (finding that even though the enterprise was not engaged in interstate commerce, it 
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underlying crime of violence be directly connected to interstate commerce to 
qualify as a VICAR crime.132 
The connection between the violent crime and the racketeering 
enterprise does not need to be strong to convict an individual under section 
1959.  Section 1959(a) explains that the violent crime must be committed for 
something of “pecuniary value” or to increase status within the organization 
“engaged in racketeering activity”.133  This is known as the “purpose” 
requirement of the VICAR statute.134  The notable feature of the “purpose” 
requirement is that the organizational component does not have to be the 
primary motive of the defendant.135  In United States v. Gardner,136 the court 
found that the prosecution had satisfied the purpose requirement by proving 
nothing more than a defendant’s membership in an organization engaged in 
racketeering activity.137  Further, in United States v. Zelaya,138 the court 
found a defendant had satisfied the purpose requirement when he committed 
a murder with knowledge that the victim was in a rival gang and subsequently 
bragged about the murder to elevate his position in MS-13.139  Finally, in 
United States v. Tse,140 the court found, “[i]f [a defendant] possessed the 
requisite intent when he entered into the conspiracy then all foreseeable 
crimes committed by the conspiracy can be attributed to that intent.”141 
Moreover, a crime of violence committed for personal reasons can still fall 
within the reach of section 1959.142  Further, to be convicted under section 
                                                          
affected interstate commerce by purchasing out-of-state lottery tickets to cover in-state gambling 
losses). 
 132.  Riddle, 249 F.3d at 538; Mills, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 571.  But see United States v. Garcia, 68 
F. Supp. 2d 802, 810–12 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (ruling that the violent crime itself, and not simply the 
connected enterprise, need to be involved in interstate commerce to qualify under section 1959).  
 133.  18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) (2018).  
 134.  United States v. Zelaya, 908 F.3d 920, 927 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Gardner, 417 
F. Supp. 2d 703, 713 (D. Md. 2006).   
 135.  Zelaya, 908 F.3d at 927; Gardner, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 713 (finding “[n]owhere does the 
statute or its legislative history indicate that the government must prove that the crime was solely 
motivated by a desire to maintain or increase a particular position within the enterprise” (alteration 
in original) (citing United States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200, 206 (1st Cir. 1998))).   
 136.  417 F. Supp. 2d 703 (D. Md. 2006).  
 137.  Id. at 713 (noting that “[i]f [defendant] joined a conspiracy within the framework of the 
‘Mitchell Organization’ to murder a particular person, he did so not only for personal gain, but for 
the gain of the ‘Mitchell Organization’”).  The Gardner court also noted that “[t]he case law makes 
it plain that the judicial gloss placed on the ‘purpose’ element of the VICAR conspiracy offense 
sweeps within its compass a broader range of intentionality and purposefulness than that borne by 
a plain reading of the statute.”  Id.  
 138.  908 F.3d 920 (4th Cir. 2018).  
 139.  Id. at 927 (finding that although the crime was primarily committed because the victims 
threatened the defendant’s friend, the crime was committed for a gang purpose because the victims 
were members of a rival gang).  
 140.  135 F.3d 200 (1st Cir. 1998).  
 141.  Id. at 207.   
 142.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 130, at 100; see also United States v. Kamaele, 748 
F.3d 984, 1008–09 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding that the purpose element was satisfied when the 
evidence established a variety of personal purposes, but also allowed for a reasonable inference that  
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1959, the government does not even have to prove that the defendant was a 
member of the racketeering enterprise.143  Some federal circuits have 
explicitly found that “[i]t would make little sense” to strictly interpret the 
purpose requirement “to provide a safe-harbor from VICAR for gang 
members who can offer a plausible alternative motivation for their acts.”144 
The wide net of permitted circumstances for conviction and range of 
permissible inferences make VICAR convictions unsuitable for 
impeachment under Maryland Rule 5-609.145  The first step in determining 
whether a conviction is within the reach of rule 5-609 is to determine whether 
the conviction falls within “the eligible universe.”146  A conviction falls 
within the “eligible universe” when its elements clearly state the conduct 
bearing on the witness’s credibility.147  When looking at the wide array of 
enumerated predicate offenses under section 1959, it becomes clear that 
VICAR convictions “cause[] the factfinder to speculate as to what conduct is 
impacting on the defendant’s credibility.”148  By the Court of Appeals’s own 
admission, “some racketeering activity . . . may not qualify as an infamous 
crime or be otherwise relevant to a witness’ credibility.”149  Maryland 
precedent makes clear that if the conduct bearing on a witness’s credibility is 
not clear from the elements of the offense, then the conviction must be 
excluded under rule 5-609.150  The wide range of predicate felonies, 
combined with the liberal interpretations of the commerce connection and 
purpose element makes it so factfinders cannot determine, by the elements of 
section 1959 alone, the conduct bearing on the witness’s credibility. 
2. The Rosales Court’s Reliance on State v. Giddens is Flawed 
In Rosales, the Court of Appeals improperly relied on State v. 
Giddens151 in deciding that VICAR convictions are proper for impeachment 
                                                          
the assault was carried out with the purpose of promoting the organization or advancing the 
defendant’s position in the organization).  
 143.  United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 384 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that independent 
contractors who receive something of “pecuniary value” can be prosecuted under section 1959).  
 144.  United States v. Banks, 506 F.3d 756, 761–64 (9th Cir. 2007) (adopting the view of five 
sister circuits which “have concluded that VICAR’s purpose element is satisfied even if the 
maintenance or enhancement of [their] position in the criminal enterprise was not the defendant’s 
sole or principal purpose”).   
 145.  See United States v. Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257, 267 (3d. Cir. 2011) (finding that racketeering 
statutes cast a “wide net”); see also Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 381 (finding that VICAR statutes, like 
RICO statutes, should be construed liberally). 
 146.  Jackson v. State, 340 Md. 705, 712, 668 A.2d 8, 12 (1995). 
 147.  Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 713, 436 A.3d 906, 913 (1981); see also supra Section II.C. 
 148. See Ricketts, 291 Md. at 713, 436 A.3d at 913 (holding that indecent exposure is not a 
proper crime for impeachment under rule 5-609 because indecent exposure is so ill-defined that it 
could be committed in an infinite amount of ways).  
 149.  Rosales v. State, 463 Md. 552, 579, 206 A.3d 916, 932 (2019) (emphasis added). 
 150.  See supra Section II.D. 
 151.  335 Md. 205, 642 A.2d 870 (1994). 
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under Maryland Rule 5-609.  The Rosales court noted that Giddens, “is the 
seminal Maryland case” on witness impeachment by prior conviction.152  In 
Giddens, the court considered whether a conviction for distribution of 
cocaine may be used to impeach a witness’s credibility.153  The Giddens court 
held that distribution of cocaine was an impeachable offense because “an 
individual convicted of cocaine distribution would be willing to lie under 
oath.”154  The court in Giddens reasoned “[a] narcotics trafficker lives a life 
of secrecy and dissembling in the course of that activity, being prepared to 
say whatever is required by the demands of the moment, whether the truth or 
a lie.”155 
The court’s analysis in Giddens ignores the facial approach required 
under Maryland Rule 5-609.156  The court in Giddens noted, “the vast 
majority of convictions for cocaine distribution are relevant to credibility.”157  
While the “vast majority of convictions” might qualify, cocaine distribution 
does not, “by its elements, . . .  clearly identify the prior conduct of the 
witness that tends to show that he is unworthy of belief.”158  The court further 
noted, “[w]e share the belief that a person will rarely be convicted of cocaine 
distribution if that person merely gives a small quantity to a friend at a 
party.”159  While this might rarely happen, the fact that it is possible indicates 
that cocaine distribution does not by its elements specifically state the 
conduct that will bear on credibility. 
Giddens generated a dissenting opinion160 that endorsed the Court of 
Special Appeals majority opinion.161  The intermediate appellate court noted 
that Maryland’s distribution and possession with intent to distribute 
statute,162 “lists over 200 substances that it defines as controlled dangerous 
ones and adds to that list as well salts, isomers, derivatives, and compounds 
of or containing those substances.”163  The court pointed out that one can be 
convicted under this statute for handing a small quantity of narcotics to a 
friend, as well as by operating a large narcotics distribution network.164  Thus, 
                                                          
 152.  Rosales, 463 Md. at 573, 206 A.3d at 928.  
 153.  Giddens, 355 Md. at 212–13, 642 A.2d at 873.  
 154.  Id. at 217, 642 A.2d at 876.  
 155.  Id. (quoting United States v. Ortiz 553 F.2d 782, 784 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
897 (1977)).  
 156.  See supra section II.D. 
 157.  Giddens, 355 Md. at 218, 642 A.2d at 876. 
 158.  Giddens, 355 Md. at 218, 642 A.2d at 876; State v. Westpoint, 404 Md. 455, 480–81, 947 
A.2d 519, 534 (2008) (ruling that a prior conviction for third-degree sexual offense is not admissible 
under Maryland Rule 5-609).  
 159.  Giddens, 355 Md. at 218, 642 A.2d at 877.  
 160.  Id. at 223, 642 A.2d at 878–79 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).   
 161.  97 Md. App. 582, 631 A.2d 499 (1993).   
 162.  MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286(a) (1987) (recodified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-
602 (LexisNexis 2017)).  
 163.  Giddens, 97 Md. App. at 590, 631 A.2d at 503.  
 164.  Id. at 590–91, 631 A.2d at 503.  
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“[t]he behavior is criminal, to be sure, but it is not necessarily dishonest.”165  
The Court of Special Appeals concluded by noting that this large net rendered 
the statute inappropriate for impeachment.166  This opinion is consistent with 
the facial approach required when interpreting crimes under rule 5-609.167 
In Rosales, the court found that Giddens provided a close factual 
match.168  As such, the court determined that a crime of violence that is done 
for the purpose of aiding a criminal enterprise engaged in racketeering 
qualifies as an “other crime relevant to the witness’s credibility” under 
Maryland Rule 5-609(a).169  Quoting Giddens, the court noted that “one who 
aids a racketeering enterprise will be living ‘a life of secrecy and 
dissembling,’ ‘being prepared to say whatever is required by the demands of 
the moment,’ and ‘pos[ing] [a] grave danger to the fabric of society.’”170  The 
court noted that many of the predicate racketeering offenses, by their 
elements, would qualify under rule 5-609; however, the court conceded that 
there are some racketeering offenses that may not qualify.171  The court 
makes a critical distinction here.  While most predicate offenses qualify, the 
court conceded that there are some predicate offenses that do not qualify as 
an infamous crime or other crime relevant to a witness’s credibility.  The 
court did not endeavor to say which predicate crimes would and would not 
qualify under Maryland Rule 5-609.  This begs the question, if someone can 
be convicted of VICAR with a predicate offense that would not otherwise 
qualify, can it be said that a VICAR conviction, by its elements, specifically 
states the conduct that bears on the witness’s credibility?  If the answer is no, 
then the crime should never be admissible under Maryland Rule 5-609. 
While the Court of Special Appeals erred in Rosales by evaluating the 
substantive acts underlying the VICAR conviction, the court correctly 
concluded that by its elements, the VICAR statute does not sufficiently 
explain the conduct that would call into question the truthfulness of the 
witness.172  The Court of Special Appeals in Rosales held that while many of 
the predicate offenses under the VICAR statute are admissible, other 
predicate offenses are pure crimes of violence, and are thus, not 
admissible.173  The Court of Special Appeals found that, “the actual conduct 
                                                          
 165.  Id. at 591, 632 A.2d at 503.  
 166.  Id.  
 167.  See supra Section II.D. 
 168.  Rosales v. State, 463 Md. 552, 578, 206 A.3d 916, 931 (2019).  
 169.  Id. at 557, 206 A.3d at 918. 
 170.  Id. at 578, 206 A.3d at 931 (quoting State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 217, 642 A.2d 870 
(1994) (alterations in original)).  
 171.  Id. at 579, 206 A.3d 916, 932 (finding that “some racketeering activity . . . may not qualify 
as an infamous crime or be otherwise relevant to a witness’ credibility”).   
 172.  Rosales v. State, No. 2659, 2017 WL 6312861 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 11, 2017), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 463 Md. 552, 206 A.3d 916 (2019). 
 173.  Id. at *8.  Specifically, the Court of Special Appeals found that predicate crimes that are 
fraud or narcotics trafficking related would qualify but pure crimes of violence such as, murder or 
kidnapping would be excluded.  Id.  
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involved is a crime of violence, which is not impeachable, and the purpose 
of committing the crime is not to deceive, but to advance in an enterprise that 
might, or might not, be engaged in deceitful acts.”174 
The Court of Appeals in Rosales erred by making the same mistake as 
the majority in Giddens.  By venturing away from the strict facial approach 
prescribed by previous case law, the court greatly expands the reach of 
Maryland Rule 5-609.175  Allowing convictions that do not bear on veracity 
could have a devastating effect on the justice system.176  If admitted, 
erroneous convictions could significantly sway a jury’s impression of a 
witness and, further, could result in flawed convictions or acquittals.177  
VICAR, like drug distribution, can be accomplished in a variety of ways with 
an infinite amount of potential circumstances ranging from pure acts of 
violence to more calculated and malevolent acts in furtherance of an illegal 
enterprise.178  As such, the elements required for a VICAR conviction do not 
clearly highlight the conduct that weighs on the witness’s propensity to tell 
the truth and thus, must be excluded under Maryland Rule 5-609.179 
B. Time for Change: Maryland Rule 5-609 and Its Unworkable 
Formula 
Since 1994, Maryland Rule 5-609’s undiscernible construction has 
continuously frustrated trial judges.  While Judge Paul Grimm of the United 
States District Court for the District of Maryland has written that Maryland 
“Rule 5-609 is a perfect example of how the three general concepts of 
evidence law—relevance, economy, and fairness—are applied.”180  Other 
commenters have been frustrated by the lack of guidance given by the Court 
of Appeals.181  For the last twenty-five years, trial judges and lawyers have 
                                                          
 174.  Id.  
 175.  By expanding the reach of the crimes allowed for impeachment under the Rule, the court 
narrows the indicia of untruthfulness by “caus[ing] the fact finder to speculate as to what conduct 
is impacting on the witness’s credibility.”  State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 218–19, 642 A.2d 870, 
876 (1994) (citing State v. Ricketts, 291 Md. 701, 713–14, 436 A.2d 906, 913 (1981)).  
 176.  Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977, 1992–01 (2016).  
 177.  Id. at 2001–04.  
 178.  United States v. Jones, 873 F.3d 482, 490 (5th Cir. 2017) (noting that “[t]he term 
‘racketeering activity’ encompasses a wide range of state and federal offenses, including murder, 
robbery, extortion, and drug-dealing”). 
 179.  See supra Section III.A. 
 180.  Paul W. Grimm, Impeachment and Rehabilitation Under the Maryland Rules of Evidence: 
An Attorney’s Guide, 24 U. BALT. L. REV 95, 125 (1994) (finding that the critical distinction for 
admission “is whether there is any logical connection between the nature of the crime and the 
honesty of the person”). 
 181.  Marion K. Goldberg, Maryland Rule 1-502: A Required Balancing Test Before 
Impeachment by Prior Criminal Conviction, 53 MD. L. REV. 844, 858 (1994) (finding that “the 
Court of Appeals gave little guidance to future trial courts regarding factors they should consider in 
conducting the requisite balancing”); James Protin, What is a “Crime Relevant to Credibility”?, 54 
MD. L. REV. 1125, 1137 (1995) (commenting that the court has not issued any “rules to guide trial 
judges”).   
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faced uncertainty about which crimes should be admitted under Maryland 
Rule 5-609.182 
Maryland Rule 5-609 has set up “a piecemeal list of crimes relevant to 
credibility”183 because crimes can only be added if the Court of Appeals 
grants certiorari, and subsequently decides that the crime is “infamous” or is  
otherwise relevant to a witness’s credibility.184  Rule 5-609’s weakness arises 
when a previously unexplored crime is proffered to challenge a witness’s 
credibility.185  Specifically, the weakness arises because the Court of Appeals 
has not given trial judges any strict guidelines to follow, thus, trial judges and 
the intermediate appellate court are making in-the-dark determinations and 
subsequently having to wait for the Court of Appeals to grant certiorari and 
decide if the crime is relevant to a witness’s credibility.186 
One year after Maryland Rule 5-609 passed, Commenter James Protin 
wrote, “[t]he Maryland Rule did not . . . follow the example set by the Federal 
Rule which more clearly delineates the crimes subject to the rule.  “This 
oversight is the single major weakness of Maryland Rule 5-609.”187  Twenty-
five years of litigation have proven this prophecy correct, and the time for 
reform has come.  Federal Rule of Evidence 609, Alabama Rule of Evidence 
609 and Indiana Rule of Evidence 609 all provide workable replacements to 
Maryland Rule 5-609.  Section IV.B.1 examines Maryland Rule 5-609’s 
federal counterpart—Federal Rule of Evidence 609.  Section IV.B.2 
examines state evidence rules that could serve as replacements to Maryland 
Rule 5-609. 
1. Federal Rule 609: A Clearer Standard 
The purpose of Federal Rule of Evidence 609 is to encourage witnesses 
to testify, while still giving the jury an accurate picture of the witness’s 
                                                          
 182.  Protin, supra note 181, at 1137 (reporting that at a public meeting on Maryland Rule 5-
609, “Chief Judge Murphy noted that failure to define clearly which crimes are relevant to a person’s 
credibility ‘leaves the trial judges . . . hanging out there not knowing . . . what . . . is eligible.’” 
(alterations in original)); Goldberg, supra note 181, at 860 (commenting that “the lack of guidance 
left defendants open to needless and costly appeals that may unnecessarily clog the courts with 
litigation aimed at ascertaining a standard”).   
 183.  Protin, supra note 181, at 1137.   
 184.  See State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 216 n.8, 642 A.2d 870, 875 n.8 (1994) (confirming that 
the Court of Appeals anticipated having to grant certiorari in a wide range of cases to decide if the 
underlying convictions are eligible for impeachment under rule 5-609); see also Goldberg, supra 
note 181.   
 185.  See Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 642 A.2d 870 (reversing the Court of Special Appeals and 
holding that the previously unexplored crime of possession with intent to distribute narcotics was a 
crime relevant to a witness’s credibility); see also Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 436 A.2d 906 
(1981) (reversing the Court of Special Appeals’ admission of the previously unexplored crime of 
indecent exposure).  
 186.  Protin, supra note 181, at 1137.  
 187.  Id. at 1133. 
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background.188  The final rule was “a compromise between the need to admit 
prior conviction evidence to impeach a witness and the accused’s right to a 
fair trial.”189  Maryland Rule 5-609 differs from Federal Rule of Evidence 
609 in that it does not delineate any per se admissible categories of 
convictions, and further, on its face, seems to have more restrictive language 
as to which crimes are admissible.190  There are some significant differences 
between Maryland Rule 5-609 and Federal Rule 609.  Notably, the Federal 
Rule mandates admission, meaning no balancing test is required, of crimes 
that involve false statements.191  Additionally, the Federal Rule allows 
admission of felony convictions, provided they survive a balancing test.192  
Comparatively, Maryland Rule 5-609 has a cloudy “eligible universe” and 
requires a balancing test for all crimes. 193 
Additionally, the Federal Rule establishes different balancing tests 
depending on the date of conviction, and the type of witness testifying.194  On 
the contrary, rule 5-609 provides only one balancing test and mandates that 
it be applied regardless of the type of witness testifying or type of 
conviction.195  Finally, the Federal Rule establishes a ten-year window for 
prior convictions to be eligible for impeachment, while rule 5-609 establishes 
a fifteen-year timeframe.196 
                                                          
 188.  Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Construction and Application of Rule 609(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence Permitting Impeachment of Witness by Evidence of Prior Conviction of Crime, 
39 A.L.R. Fed. 570, § 3 (1978).  
 189.  Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with Federal Rule of Evidence 609: A Look at How 
Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 10 (1999).  However, “those 
favoring greater admission of prior conviction evidence got the better end of the compromise.”  Id.   
 190.  Protin, supra note 181, at 1131.  
 191.  McLain, supra note 49, at 154. 
 192.  Id.  A felony is defined as, “[a] serious crime usu. punishable by imprisonment for more 
than one year or by death.”  Felony, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
 193.  Jackson v. State, 340 Md. 705, 712, 668 A.2d 8, 12 (1995); see supra Sections II.C; II.E.  
 194.  If the conviction is more than 10 years old,  
Evidence of the conviction is admissible only if:  
(1) its probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially 
outweighs its prejudicial effect; and  
(2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it 
so that the party has a fair opportunity to contest its use. 
FED. R. EVID. 609(b)(1)–(2).  The federal rule provides that “in a criminal case in which the witness 
is [the] defendant, . . . the probative value of the evidence [must] outweigh[] its prejudicial effect to 
that defendant.”  FED R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B).  This is a higher threshold than if the witness is not the 
accused.  FED R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(A). 
 195.  MCLAIN, supra note 49, at 154–55 (emphasis added); see also Goldberg, supra note 181, 
at 844–45 (noting that the application of the balancing test to all convictions “significantly changed 
trial practice in Maryland’s state courts”).  
 196.  Compare FED. R. EVID. 609(b) (creating a ten-year admissibility timeframe for prior 
convictions) with MD. R. 5-609(b) (establishing a fifteen-year admissibility timeframe for prior 
convictions).  Some Maryland judges have suggested that the more recent the conviction, the more 
probative it is to the witness’s credibility.  Jackson v. State, 340 Md. 705, 717, 668 A.2d 8, 14 
(1995).  Thus, by extending the timeframe by five years, Maryland courts are increasing the number 
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Although Maryland Rule 5-609 appears on its face to be more restrictive 
than Federal Rule 609, depending on the underlying conviction, it can act 
more leniently.197  Under the Federal Rule, pure crimes of violence are 
admissible, whereas Maryland courts have specifically excluded these 
convictions.198  However, the Federal Rule excludes more crimes that involve 
dishonesty or false statements than Maryland Rule 5-609.199  For example, 
rule 609 rejects possession with intent to distribute as a crime bearing on a 
witness’s credibility.200  Further, rule 609 excludes crimes such as, theft201 
and shoplifting202 from its per se admissible “dishonest act or false statement” 
prong, all of which would likely be permitted under rule 5-609.203  However, 
it is possible that these crimes could be admitted if they meet the 
qualifications of rule 609(a)(1)’s felony requirements.204 
The major advantage of Federal Rule 609 is the definitive language 
establishing different categories of per se impeachable crimes.205  Under the 
Federal Rule, crimes that require “dishonesty or false statement,” or are 
felonies punishable by more than one year are per se admissible, meaning 
                                                          
of convictions eligible and increasing the possibility that a crime that does not bear on a witness’s 
credibility will be admitted.  Id. at 715, 668 A.2d at 13.  
 197.  Goldberg, supra note 181, at 857; see also supra note 190 and accompanying text.  
 198.  See United States v. Smalls, 752 F.3d 1227, 1239–40 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding the district 
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting, for impeachment purposes, a conviction for 
aggravated battery with a deadly weapon); United States v. Commanche, 577 F.3d 1261, 1270–71 
(10th Cir. 2009) (finding the fact of an aggravated assault conviction, but not the facts underlying 
the conviction, proper for impeachment under rule 609(a)); United States v. Causey, 9 F.3d 1341, 
1343, 1344 (7th Cir. 1993) (allowing impeachment for a felon in possession of a sawed-off shotgun 
conviction).  But see State v. Duckett, 306 Md. 503, 510 A.2d 253 (1986) (holding that battery is 
non-impeachable); Jones v. State, 217 Md. App. 676, 703–06, 94 A.3d 813 (2014) (holding that 
attempted second-degree murder is a non-impeachable offense).   
 199.  Compare FED R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (mandating admission of any conviction that “the court 
can readily determine . . . the elements of the crime required . . . a dishonest act of false statement”) 
with MD. R. 5-609(a) (permitting, but not mandating, impeachment if the crime “was an infamous 
crime or other crime relevant to the witness’s credibility”); see also Lynn McLain, Federal Law: 
Types of Convictions Admissible, MD. PRAC. SERIES § 609:6 (2019) (“The legislative history of FED. 
R. EVID. 609 makes clear Congress’s intent that FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) be construed narrowly, in 
that ‘dishonest or false statement’ is intended to mean ‘deceit, untruthfulness, or 
falsification,’. . . [and] encompasses only crimes that necessarily involve falsehood or 
misrepresentation.”).  
 200.  See United States v. Lewis, 626 F.2d 940, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (ruling that possession with 
intent to distribute does not involve the type of dishonesty that Congress intended to exclude).  
 201.  See United States v. Johnson, 388 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that theft is not a per se 
admissible offense under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2)).  
 202.  See United States v. Amaechi, 991 F.2d 374, 378–79 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that the 
district court correctly barred a shoplifting conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 609). 
 203.  FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2); see United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(finding the “quantum of stealth” does not necessarily equal dishonesty on the witness stand).  But 
see Jackson v. State, 340 Md. 705, 719, 668 A.2d 8, 12 (1995) (ruling that theft is an impeachable 
offense under Maryland Rule 5-609).  
 204.  FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1); see Johnson, 388 F.3d at 101 (finding that if the lower court had 
engaged in the requisite balancing, it is possible that a theft conviction could have been admitted).  
 205.  FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2); United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1056–57 (D.C. Cir. 
1983). 
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they require no balancing test.206  Although federal courts still have to decide 
(1) whether the crime involves dishonesty or false statement and (2) if the 
crime does not, and the witness is a defendant, whether the probative value 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, the majority of crimes do 
not require any balancing to be performed.207 
The ambiguity in Maryland’s Rule is two-fold.  The first ambiguous step 
in the analysis is to determine whether the raised conviction is either an 
“infamous crime” or “other crime relevant to a witness’s credibility.”208  By 
drafting the Rule to say “other crime relevant to a witness’s credibility,” 
instead of a more definite class of crimes, such as felonies, Maryland trial 
judges have to make informed guesses as to whether the conviction qualifies 
under this category.209  Federal courts also allow trial judges to look to the 
facts of the conviction when determining whether or not a crime can be used 
for impeachment, eliminating the facial approach mandated in Maryland.210 
The second ambiguity is in rule 5-609(a)(2)’s requirement that all 
convictions be weighed to determine whether “the probative value of 
admitting th[e] evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.”211  This 
balancing creates ambiguity because the Court of Appeals has not issued any 
hard-and-fast rules for trial judges to apply when conducting the balancing 
test.212  The Federal Rule only requires balancing for the narrow class of 
crimes where a defendant witness is being impeached for a felony that was 
punishable by more than one year.213  Through a clearer construction and 
nearly fifty years of federal litigation, Federal Rule of Evidence 609 provides 
a sound alternative to Maryland Rule 5-609 due to its per se admissible 
categories of eligible convictions that can be easily interpreted by trial judges. 
2. A Clearer Future: State Evidence Law Solutions to Maryland Rule 
5-609 
Many states have crafted witness impeachment by use of a prior 
conviction rules that could serve as a workable alternative to Maryland Rule 
5-609.214  Most states have adopted rules that resemble Federal Rule of 
                                                          
 206.  Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1056–57 (finding that the phrase “shall be admitted” gives a 
linguistic inference that all felonies should be admitted).   
 207.  Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989).  
 208.  MD. R. 5-609(a)(1).  
 209.  Id.  
 210.  See Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1067 (suggesting that “specific facts will . . . prove relevant to 
the rule 609(a)(1) balancing”).  
 211.  MD. R. 5-609(a)(2). 
 212.  Goldberg, supra note 181, at 860.  
 213.  FED R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B).  
 214.  See Dodson, supra note 189, at 22 n.201.   
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Evidence 609.215  California and Missouri depart from rule 609 and allow any 
conviction to be used to impeach a witness.216  On the opposite side of the 
spectrum, Montana does not allow any conviction to be used for the purposes 
of witness impeachment.217  This Section will propose two state evidence rule 
alternatives to replace Maryland Rule 5-609.  Section IV.2.A will discuss 
Alabama Rule of Evidence 609 and its benefits, while Section IV.2.B. will 
explore Indiana Rule of Evidence 609 and its benefits.  
a. Alabama Rule of Evidence 609
Alabama Rule of Evidence 609 provides trial judges with a workable 
framework to determine which convictions should be admitted. 218  This Rule 
establishes the nature of the offense and the type of witness (accused vs. non-
accused) as determinative factors in deciding the admissibility of a prior 
conviction.219  The Rule employs a more stringent balancing test for 
admission of an accused witness’s prior conviction and a less stringent 
test for admission of a non-accused witness’s prior conviction.220  This 
is a significant distinction that Maryland Rule 5-609 does not make.221 
215. See id. at 14; D.C. CODE § 14-305 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-609 (West 1975); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 27-2609 (West 2004); ARK. R. EVID. 609; MICH. R. EVID. 609; N.M. R. EVID. 
11-609; S.C. R. EVID. 609; VT. R. EVID. 609; WASH. R. EVID. 609; WYO. R. EVID. 609.
216. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1967); MO. ANN. STAT. § 491.050 (West 2011).
217. MONT. R. EVID. 609.  Montana courts, however, “have not allowed witnesses to bolster
their credibility by making false statements about past convictions.”  Dodson, supra note 189, at 21. 
218. The Rule states in relevant part:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1)(A) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was 
convicted, and 
(1)(B) evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted 
if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs 
its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
ALA. R. EVID. 609. 
219. Daniel R. Tilly, Victims Under Attack: North Carolina’s Flawed Rule 609, 97 N.C. L. REV.
1553, 1575 (2019).  
220. Under the Alabama Rule, the evidence is per se admissible if it was punishable by more
than one year of imprisonment for a non-accused witness; however, if the witness is the accused 
then, the court must determine if  “the probative value of admitting [the] evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the accused.” ALA. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B).   
221. Compare ALA. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(A) (announcing that “evidence that a witness other than 
an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403 . . . ), and ALA. R. 
EVID. 609(a)(1)(B) (announcing that “evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime 
shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused”), with MD. R. 5-609(a)(2) (mandating that “the court 
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs the danger of unfair 
prejudice to the witness”).  
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Further, the Rule mandates admission of convictions that “involve[] 
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.”222  Alabama 
courts interpret “dishonesty” broadly.223  So long as the crimes “involve 
‘dishonesty (meaning breach of honesty or trust, as lying, deceiving, 
cheating, stealing or defrauding) and bear[] directly on the capacity of a 
witness . . . to testify truthfully at trial’” the crimes are admissible.224  
Importantly, if a balancing test is required, Alabama trial judges are permitted  
to inquire into the facts of a witness’s prior conviction to determine if the 
conviction would bear on a witness’s veracity.225  By delineating felonies and 
specifically defining what is meant by “dishonesty or false statement,” 
Alabama courts have given trial judges an adequate framework to determine 
which convictions are eligible.226 
The Alabama approach allows for a broader range of impeachable 
convictions while still focusing on the elements of dishonesty and 
untruthfulness.  Alabama’s test is a substantive departure from the crimen 
falsi approach defined under the Federal Rule.227  By expanding the scope of 
per se admissible crimes, and limiting the number of crimes that require a 
balancing test, Alabama has eliminated much of the current ambiguity 
surrounding Maryland Rule 5-609.228  Specifically, by adopting Alabama’s 
Rule, Maryland would eliminate discretion from trial court judges and give 
litigants a clearer picture of which convictions are impeachable, while still 
protecting an accused-witness. 
                                                          
 222.  ALA. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).  
 223.  Ex Parte Byner, 270 So. 3d 1162, 1166 (Ala. 2018) (citing C. GAMBLE & R. GOODWIN, 
MCELROY’S ALABAMA EVIDENCE § 145.01(7)(c–d), at 871–72 (6th ed. 2009)).  
 224.  Id.  The court notes that examples of this category of crime include “burglary, robbery and 
larceny.”  Id.   
 225.  See, e.g., Snyder v. State, 893 So. 2d 488, 541 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (finding that “[t]he 
record shows that the trial court and both attorneys had copies of the case action summary sheets 
relating to the prior conviction and appeared to be aware of the specifics concerning the 
conviction”); Maxwell v. State, 387 So. 2d 328, 332 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (agreeing that 
shoplifting may be a crime relevant to credibility depending on the circumstances of the conviction).  
 226.  See Huffman v. State, 706 So. 2d 808, 808 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (affirming the trial 
court’s admission of a previous theft conviction); Morris v. Morris, 144 So. 3d 328, 335 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 2013) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a shoplifting conviction).  
 227.  Ex Parte Byner, 270 So. 3d at 1168–69.  In deviating from the Federal Rule, the Alabama 
Supreme Court determined that while its rules of evidence are modeled on the federal rules, 
Alabama can choose to “not follow[] the federal majority view on this issue where to do so would 
change the state’s substantive law.”  Huffman, 706 So. 2d at 813.  Crimen falsi is a much narrower 
test that requires that the “very nature [of the crimes] permit the impeachment of a witness.”  Ex 
Parte Byner, 270 So. 3d at 1167.  Under Alabama’s approach, a crime “involves dishonesty or false 
statement” as long as the crime “bears directly on the capacity of a witness convicted of that offense 
to testify truthfully at trial.”  Huffman, 706 So. 2d at 813–14.  
 228.  See Ex Parte Byner, 270 So. 3d at 1164, 1170 (finding that robbery is per se admissible 
under Alabama Rule of Evidence 609 as well as “embezzlement, perjury, subordination of perjury, 
false statement, criminal fraud, false pretense, forgery, worthless check violations, failure to file tax 
returns, counterfeiting and bribery” (citing C. GAMBLE, MCELROY’S ALABAMA RULE OF 
EVIDENCE §145.01(9), at 675–76 (5th ed 1996))); see also Huffman, 706 So. 2d at 814 (noting that 
theft is a per se admissible crime).   
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b. Indiana Rule of Evidence 609
Indiana Rule of Evidence 609229 also provides a workable alternative 
to Maryland Rule 5-609.  This Rule deviates from Federal Rule 609 by 
mandating admission of qualifying convictions.230  This deviation was no 
accident.  Indiana specifically intended to eliminate the balancing portion of 
the Federal Rule.231  By mandating admission of convictions that fall within 
the scope of the Rule, Indiana has eliminated all discretion from trial judges, 
thus creating certainty as to which crimes will and will not be admitted.232  
Indiana has taken this novel approach “to prevent the jury from inferring that 
the witness must be a liar merely because [they] ha[ve] done bad things.”233 
Further, to guarantee that only crimes that bear on a witness’s credibility are 
admitted, Indiana courts allow for trial judges to examine the underlying facts 
of conviction when evaluating crimes that involve “dishonesty or false 
statement.”234  The Indiana case law, or lack thereof, suggests that Indiana 
Rule 609(a)’s hard-and-fast requirements have been successful; however, 
interestingly, rule 609(b)’s provision which requires trial courts to balance 
229. This Rule states in relevant part:
(a) General Rule.  For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that
the witness has been convicted of a crime or an attempt of a crime must be admitted but
only if the crime committed or attempted is (1) murder, treason, rape, robbery,
kidnapping, burglary, arson, or criminal confinement; or (2) a crime involving dishonesty 
or false statement, including perjury.
(b) Limit on Using the Evidence After 10 Years.  This subdivision (b) applies if more
than ten (10) years have passed since the witness’s conviction or release from
confinement for it, whichever is later.  Evidence of the conviction is admissible only if:
(1) its probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially 
outweighs its prejudicial effect; and
(2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to
use it so that the party has a fair opportunity to contests its use.
IND. R. EVID. 609(a)–(b). 
230. See Britt v. State, 937 N.E.2d 914, 916 (Ind. 2010) (finding that the language of Indiana
Rule of Evidence 609 is mandatory). 
231. See Jenkins v. State, 677 N.E.2d 624, 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that “Indiana has
specifically rejected this part of the federal rule with the intention of preserving prior Indiana law 
in this area”); see also Ashton v. Anderson, 279 N.E.2d 210, 213 (Ind. 1972) (finding that it is clear 
that any person convicted “for the crimes of treason, murder, rape, arson, burglary, robbery, 
kidnapping, forgery and willful and corrupt perjury” are eligible to be impeached via their record 
of convictions).  
232. Anderson, 279 N.E.2d at 216 (finding that “we see little wisdom in permitting the exclusion
of such evidence to rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.  Simply stated, either the particular 
criminal conviction reflects on the witness’ credibility for truth and veracity, or it does not”); 
Jenkins, 677 N.E.2d at 626–27.   
233. Pierce v. State, 640 N.E.2d 730, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
234. See Fletcher v. State, 340 N.E.2d 771, 774–75 (Ind. 1976) (finding that for convictions like 
theft, attorneys should make the facts of conviction known to trial judges in pre-trial motions in 
limine).  
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convictions outside of the ten-year timeframe has attracted more litigation.235  
By eliminating Maryland Rule 5-609’s mandatory balancing test and 
designating specific crimes as per se admissible, Indiana Rule 609 paints a 
clear picture as to which prior convictions are eligible for impeachment, 
which in turn, enables trial judges to make consistent rulings, and further  
results in litigants having a clear idea as to which convictions will be subject 
to impeachment.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In Rosales v. State, the Court of Appeals improperly held that VICAR 
convictions qualified as “other crime[s] relevant to the witness’s credibility” 
under Maryland Rule 5-609.236  In admitting VICAR convictions, the court 
severely blurred the line as to the impeachability of past convictions under 
the Rule.237  The Rosales decision highlights why the framework of Maryland 
Rule 5-609 is unworkable for trial judges and the intermediate appellate 
court.238  To cure this defect, the legislature should consider adopting a new 
rule that would provide trial judges with a more workable framework for 
determining which convictions can and cannot be used for impeachment.239  
While no rule is necessarily perfect, Federal Rule of Evidence 609, as well 
as Alabama and Indiana Rules of Evidence 609, would provide trial judges 
with a sturdier platform to analyze admissible prior convictions for witness 
impeachment.240 
                                                          
 235.  See Whiteside v. State, 853 N.E.2d 1021, 1029–30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that the 
trial court erred in admitting defendant’s prior auto theft conviction because the state did not comply 
with Indiana Rule of Evidence 609(b)’s notice requirement); Scalissi v. State, 759 N.E.2d 618, 625 
(Ind. 2001) (finding “that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted stale convictions 
without an analysis of the facts and circumstances surrounding the convictions”); Dowdy v. State, 
672 N.E.2d 948, 952 (Ind. 1996) (finding that the probative value of defendant’s previous conviction 
did overcome Indiana Rule of Evidence 609(b)’s presumption of inadmissibility).   
 236.  See supra Part III.   
 237.  See supra Section IV.A.2. 
 238.  See supra Section IV.A.2. 
 239.  See supra Section IV.B. 
 240.  See supra Section IV.B.   
